I've spent several days learning everything I could about the Iraq War--in fact, I wrote what eventually sprawled into over a page of commentary about how difficult it is for the average person to sort through the dizzying number of divergent opinions and ‘facts’ about the war. In the end, I decided that posting this commentary would be too great a digression; but I can summarize by saying I strongly urge us to approach any analysis of the war with great humility, and to be especially skeptical of simple, neat, and easy to understand narratives.
With that said, I do think we can make some comments about the American character. My take on Brian’s unmoving center of gravity is that he is referring to something fundamental in the American psyche. America is an aspirational place, and I think history tells us that it is very American to want to be the hero: to save the day, wear the white hat, and help people. Many suggest that when it comes to its foreign policy, realism and idealism are two competing aspects of America’s true self. I disagree, and think that idealism is the true self, while realism is a suppression of this true self in the face of strategic considerations. But it’s not American to want to be a realist.
Europeans, in contrast, don’t appear to be as aspirational, and seem more comfortable just being who they are, while letting others follow their own paths as well. Perhaps this reluctance to get involved in the affairs of others is a result of Europe’s longer history and deeper culture. A sense of shame over its colonial past, and a greater inclination towards philosophical and moral relativism, may also contribute. Britain—never quite part of Europe—is an interesting case. Tony Blair, who is of course by no means a typical Brit, seemed to be motivated by a certain sense of duty. Above all, his speeches sparked the most for me when he talked about doing the right thing when it was difficult to do so.
Of course this American heroic ideal doesn’t always carry the day when decisions are being made and interests balanced. But its influence is always felt, often more at the ground level than at the top, where the higher order strategic considerations that sometimes limit the ideal’s expression hold less sway. Providing a better life for the people of Iraq was never put forward as the primary reason for the war, but it was always among the supporting rationales. And as things went sideways, and Americans needed to look for reasons to stay, you started to hear more about helping Iraqis. When soldiers are interviewed, they don’t talk about geo-political strategy; rather, they are proudest of having liberated Iraq, and of having left it a better place. When the war was freshly won, there were no standing orders yet for how to administer Iraq. What did soldiers do? They began assembling village elders and working to keep the peace, help people, and start rebuilding. They did this until they were told to stop by Rumsfeld, who didn’t want the army to become entangled in policing the locals—he’d been hoping for a swift handover of all such duties to a provisional Iraqi government.
I cannot tell you exactly which American actions were motivated by generosity and the heroic ideal, and which were inspired by self-interest. Events are too complex for that, and often both motivations were involved (and aligned). But when you take things down to the level of the individual, it typically seemed like the more generous ideals provided the real day-to-day muscle behind a person’s actions. Take Paul Bremer, the primary American ‘Viceroy’ in Iraq. He may have made mistakes. And he clearly understood that America had interests in Iraq. However, when you watch videos of him, you can see that he worked himself to the bone during his period as administrator: 20-hour workdays, unexpected surprises every few hours, etc. And when you listen to interviews of Bremer from that time, it is clear that what is ‘getting him up in the morning’ is helping Iraqis. You see this in interviews with the troops as well.
Coming to the more specific assertions made in this thread, I’m actually a little uncertain what Geoff is suggesting. With respect to oil contracts, they may have been among the many ticks in the “go to war” column, but I do not believe the desire to secure oil contracts was ever a decisive factor in the decision to go to war. Even if one approaches this from a completely mercenary perspective, the potential profits are just too small relative to the cost of the war (even acknowledging that in the beginning, everyone thought the war would be much cheaper). Granted, many of Bush and Cheney’s acquaintances were ‘oilmen’ (as were Bush and Cheney), but the President and Vice-President were also fierce patriots. I cannot see either of them putting corporate profits ahead of the national interest. And it seems to me that spending hundreds of billions from the national treasury to put a fraction of that money back in the coffers of a few private oil firms would be just that. From what I have read, the primary aim with respect to oil was to keep it flowing so as to maintain the world oil supply and keep prices from spiking. To the extent that American involvement was motivated by oil, it was ultimately about making sure that someone was pumping Iraqi oil, and it didn’t really matter who that was.
With regard to the idea that America is some kind of ‘fair weather friend’ because it will leave if Iraq make the relationship too costly for the American’s to afford, I’m not sure I see Geoff’s point. This is true of any relationship, be it between nations or individuals. At some point, any connection can simply become too difficult to maintain. This is so axiomatic that it doesn’t really tell us anything. What distinguishes is how high the threshold is before you walk away. And what kinds of ‘returns’ one is looking for to justify their ‘investment’. In the American case, I see no evidence that a few paltry (in the context of a trillion dollars worth of sunk costs) oil contracts are what America needs to stay involved. The ‘returns’ America is interested in are much broader than that. At this point, America is primarily looking for progress along the road to democracy, and the influence that will have on the Middle East. And it is worth remembering that despite Obama running on a platform that called for a complete American withdrawal from Iraq, in the end he asked to stay. The administration wanted to keep a significant number of forces on the ground past 2011; it was the Iraqis who refused.
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