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First I’d like to say that it is not my intention to lessen the terrible significance of Hiroshima in this reply, rather I would like to answer the question posed, namely: why did America not issue a warning first, before dropping the bombs?

Stating that Hiroshima was greater than the tragedies of the Holocaust doesn’t seem useful to me in discovering the reasons why there was no warning for Hiroshima first. Saying Hitler was insane and therefore not as responsible for his actions, also doesn’t seem useful. Hitler may have seemed the sanest to some of his followers. We all know that sanity is dictated by the victor. History does not write itself, after all.

I think we have to take into account what passes for acceptable in wartimes. There are many other tragedies like that of Hiroshima during WWII. For example, there was the firebombing of Dresden, of which Kurt Vonnegut famously wrote.
“You guys burnt the place down, turned it into a single column of flame. More people died there in the first storm, in that one big flame, than died in Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.”

History is in itself an interpretation, and the current interpretation is one that this article I’d like to present hopes to argue. It helped me to think about some of the pressing questions I had and have about Hiroshima also:

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/29/the_bomb_didnt_beat_japan_nuclear_world_war_ii

First I’d like to say that the question of a warning assumes the persuasiveness of a warning at wartime, that it would have held just as much sway as the actual bombing. Then it assumes that Hiroshima was pivotal to Japan’s decision to surrender. It assumes that the severity of the bombs was unlike any other tragedy in the war, and thus without a doubt, had particular swaying power in convincing Japan.

I’d like to sum up some of what the article poses.
First, Japan was already being constantly firebombed by American forces. With the death and destruction already happening in Japan, a warning shot may have had no particular sway over Japan’s decisions to surrender, especially since the display of the warning shot would not have posed a greater single threat than the multitude of fire bombings that had already occurred.
Second, the bombing of Hiroshima itself may not have had any particular sway in Japan’s decision to surrender either. As the article suggests, there were many other political reasons for surrendering, reasons that America was probably aware of, including Russian influence. Perhaps the immediacy of these problems leads the Americans to think that a warning would not have been affective in stopping the war, or rather, attaining victory. America wanted its hands on the pen of history just like everybody else did.

Again, I’m not trying to undermine the severity of what happened at Hiroshima. I’m just lending some information that may help to answer your still relevant question.

Thank you very much, Josh and Todd.
Todd, my understanding is that mostly America felt it needed to show two, simple as that. And there are records of Japanese government disbelief that they could have more than one. We must remember what a colossal phenomenon it was at the time. I myself would have doubted it probably, and the Japanese authorities were buried in their own narrow worldview. As they say, it "beggared the imagination".
Josh, your response is rich and interesting, thank you. I'm afraid that I don't see how it speaks to what I asked, which was very specific, but I shall try to speak to it as best I can, on its own merits.
Stating that Hiroshima was greater than the tragedies of the Holocaust doesn’t seem useful to me in discovering the reasons why there was no warning for Hiroshima first.
I did not think the first (which is not quite what I said) was part of the second.
Saying Hitler was insane and therefore not as responsible for his actions, also doesn’t seem useful.
Please see above.
Hitler may have seemed the sanest to some of his followers. We all know that sanity is dictated by the victor.
I'm afraid I can't agree with this, Josh, and I do think it matters (though not to my question). Neither the Germans nor the Japanese would, I think, consider America insane. And they both lost. What Hitler did was no less horrible, but the horror we feel about him is less I think, when we understand he was effectively mad (by that time at least). Truman, as I said, seems to have been a decent man.
I think we have to take into account what passes for acceptable in wartimes. There are many other tragedies like that of Hiroshima during WWII. For example, there was the firebombing of Dresden, of which Kurt Vonnegut famously wrote.
“You guys burnt the place down, turned it into a single column of flame. More people died there in the first storm, in that one big flame, than died in Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.”
Mr. Vonnegut is not, perhaps, the best source for such facts. The number appears to be likely around 18,000, to a maximum about 25,000, according to the recent expert study (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1067489/Death-toll-Second-World-War-Dresden-bombing-25-000-commission-finds.html), which is a fraction of the Hiroshima toll, even before the waves of radiation deaths began. However, the colossal firestorm caused by the firebombing of Tokyo in March 9-10, 1945, the largest single bombing raid in human history, involving a total of 334 B52s, is estimated to have killed around 100,000 people, even more than the immediate destruction caused by the bombing of Hiroshima.
Grinding up such numbers, however, feels sordid.
What it is about the atomic bomb and its unique form of destruction that feels peculiarly obscene to many (including me), compared to 334 B52s making a pyre of Tokyo is, perhaps, something more for the "Drone strike" thread. It is an interesting and important question, but not mine.
First I’d like to say that the question of a warning assumes the persuasiveness of a warning at wartime, that it would have held just as much sway as the actual bombing.
I don't see that. I merely ask why they did not try?
Then it assumes that Hiroshima was pivotal to Japan’s decision to surrender.
Not pivotal. Just important. The 1.6 million Russians sweeping into Manchuria may well have been more important to the actual surrender. But of course that would only make it less necessary to destroy 90,000 women, children and old people in an instant, not more.
It assumes that the severity of the bombs was unlike any other tragedy in the war,
I think most would say it was, in its way.
and thus without a doubt, had particular swaying power in convincing Japan.
Particular, but not complete, I think most would say.

First, Japan was already being constantly firebombed by American forces. With the death and destruction already happening in Japan, a warning shot may have had no particular sway over Japan’s decisions to surrender, especially since the display of the warning shot would not have posed a greater single threat than the multitude of fire bombings that had already occurred.
If the actual bombing mattered, a demonstration of the bombing would also matter of course, to a lesser degree. Remember, please, I only ask why they didn't try.
Second, the bombing of Hiroshima itself may not have had any particular sway in Japan’s decision to surrender either.
Please see above.
As the article suggests, there were many other political reasons for surrendering, reasons that America was probably aware of
Then, as I said, the horrific suffering caused by the bombing would be even less justified, not more, no?
Perhaps the immediacy of these problems leads the Americans to think that a warning would not have been affective in stopping the war, or rather, attaining victory. America wanted its hands on the pen of history just like everybody else did.
This sounds rather flippant, if you will excuse me saying.
Again, I’m not trying to undermine the severity of what happened at Hiroshima. I’m just lending some information that may help to answer your still relevant question.
I'm afraid it did not, but I am very grateful for your effort, and you certainly raise some interesting points for other discussion of Hiroshima. The very fact that the firebombing of Tokyo is known by so few, yet Hiroshima remains one of the handful of definitive moments of the twentieth century, means that even in attempting to understand it, we attempt to understand ourselves at the deepest level.

Lately, I've reexamined a bunch of historical events that I thought understood because I too accepted the consensus explanation. And from the Iraq war to Vietnam to aspects of the Second World War, I've been finding that the accepted consensus is almost always wrong, or at the very least seriously flawed. This trend seems to be continuing with respect to the first atomic bombs. I've been looking into the reasoning behind dropping the bombs, and even after a rather cursory examination, I'm nothing short of shocked. The idea that the bombs saved lives seems to be completely baseless, and while I need to read more, this is seeming more and more like the greatest war crime that has ever been swept under the rug. Nagasaki is particularly appalling because it seems entirely gratuitous. I'll post again when I know more, but it looks like Truman has a lot of blood on his hands. Truman in general is coming across far differently than his conventional image as the competent, no nonsense everyman president.

This was a good starting point:

It provided the basic lay of the land and the key players. Right now I'm looking most carefully at James Byrnes, the Secretary of State at the time, who seems to be a key (or even THE key) player.

I think that the decision to use the atomic bomb can only be understood within the greater context of the strategic bombing of cities in WW II. This was one of those cases where finding our footing on a 'slippery slope' proved difficult, and the deliberate targeting of civilians became more and more accepted and commonplace.

Thank you very much, Wyatt. I followed, with great interest, the complex tale of ‘Why the bomb was dropped’, but sadly again learned almost nothing about my question.
I think maybe I should just stop asking, and stop obstructing the broader discussion of Hiroshima, but first I will summarize what I learned about my question from the video.
First, I should clearly distinguish my question again from the bigger question of why they dropped the bomb.
Even if all the pro-bomb reasons were accepted, my question would remain, and even become more pressing for me. It is not 'why did they drop the bomb?', but 'why did they drop the bomb on a civilian population center, with no warning?'.
Ironically, it seems that it was two military men, General Marshall and especially Colonel Stimson, who felt that dropping the bomb on a population center, with no warning, could make America be seen as no better than Hitler. And it was interesting to see that both the Hollywood film and President Truman himself seemed to want to avoid being seen this way: in the film, when one Enola Gay crew member shows regret for how many innocent people he is about to kill, his fellow crew member says 'we've been dropping warning leaflets for 10 days now!', and President Truman says he will drop it on a military site and will give warning (both proposed by General Marshall, and both not done by President Truman).
It was most frustrating to never hear why Colonel Stimson's suggestion to demonstrate the bomb was rejected by the 'Interim Committee'. But at least I now know it was suggested, by someone important, in that most important context, and was clearly, completely and permanently rejected. Thank you, Wyatt, for that!
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In my scientific work, I am often surprised by how evidence can appear in strange ways and forms. Maybe it is so here. Please forgive me as I try to explain this complex thought.
Maybe, the more my question is not answered, by such thorough investigations as in this video, the more it is actually being answered, but in a different way.
Could it be that the reason we can find no decent explanation for why America rejected the warning demonstration, is that the explanation is simply indecent? As you say, Wyatt, the bombing of Hiroshima appears to emerge from an increasing willingness to use 'terror' bombing in the war. But the atom bomb was a special, unprecedented form of terror, especially at the time. This was repeatedly stressed in the video. So what made it acceptable on innocent women and children (not a military target) and with no 'warning leaflets' at all?
Why did America not demonstrate the bomb and give the Japanese a chance to save them from seeming as bad as Hitler?
Maybe for the same reason as Hitler had for destroying countless innocent Jewish women and children: they did not count. 'The only good Jap is a dead Jap.' When innocent people do not matter anymore, when they are not even really seen as people anymore, atrocities in war become not merely possible but inevitable. Except for General Marshall and Colonel Stimson, and the scientists in the Szilard petition, the video did not mention one important American who even considered the moral responsibility of bombing civilians without warning. Moreover, the shocking fate of the petition speaks much about the Nazi-like attitude of General Groves and Dr. Oppenheimer (http://www.atomicheritage.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=63).
Could it be as simple as this, in the end?
No one warned the Japanese because the Japanese were not worth warning.

Some more info. on the demonstration idea.

Later, in mid-June 1945, the Scientist Advisory Committee met in Los Alamos, and a demonstration was discussed again. No minutes were kept, but we have the later recollections of Arthur H. Compton, a member of the committee:

Ten days later, at Oppenheimer's invitation, Lawrence, Fermi and I spent a long weekend at Los Alamos.... We were determined to find, if we could, some effective way of demonstrating the power of an atomic bomb without loss of life that would impress Japan's warlords. If only this could be done Ernest Lawrence was the last one of our group to give up hope for finding such a solution. The difficulties of making a purely technical demonstration that would carry its impact effectively into Japan's controlling councils were indeed great. We had to count on every possible effort to distort even obvious facts. Experience with the determination of Japan's fighting men made it evident that the war would not be stopped unless these men themselves were convinced of its futility.

Even Leo Szilard, famous originator of the Slizard Petition, later wrote that:

I think it is clear that you can't demonstrate a bomb over an uninhabited island. You have to demolish a city.

And John J. McCloy, who as the Assistant Secretary or War under Stimson had recommended reconsideration of the demonstration idea, later wrote:

The decisions recommending the use of the bomb, made by the interim committee formed by President Truman, were reached after thorough exploration of every possible angle: Could you have a demonstration? What would be its effects? We had not at that time seen the explosion at Alamogordo, but I can just say that if I had been a Japanese observer and seen the bomb go off at Alamogordo, I would not have advised surrender. It's one thing to see something go off, causing no damage at all but creating a great ball of fire and obviously of tremendous power, but it's another thing to say: "Well, now, they set this off on a tower; maybe it weighs 50 tons. How do we know they can deliver it?" And I am sure that anyone who was a sound thinker would have said: "No, that doesn't convince us. In the first place, would they have another?" For example, the German scientists believed that it would be impossible for us to make an atomic bomb, and that if we did we could make only one. The Germans thought of an atomic bomb as something that would have to contain as much as 20 tons of uranium 235, a practically impossible quantity.

And Robert B. Franks, writing in 2009, has the following perspective on whether a demonstration would have induced Japan to surrender:

An atomic bomb virtually destroyed Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. In the early morning of August 9, the Soviet Union entered the war with a massive offensive in Manchuria. A few hours later a second atomic bomb inflicted tremendous damage on Nagasaki. The immediate and lingering effects of the two revolutionary weapons killed between 100,000 and 200,000 Japanese.

It took twenty-four hours for Tokyo to learn of the damage to Hiroshima and the American claim that it was inflicted by an atomic bomb. The militarists immediately erected two lines of defense: first, whatever struck Hiroshima, it was not an atomic bomb; second, even if it was an atomic bomb, the difficulty of manufacturing fissionable material to power the weapon meant the U.S. could not have that many bombs, or that the bombs would not be that powerful. These conclusions were the fruit of Japan’s own efforts to build an atomic bomb. These exertions provided no useable weapon, but did instruct Japan’s leaders in the difficulty of producing fissionable material. This revelation also demonstrates the futility of any single demonstration of an atomic weapon. Further, the news of Soviet intervention did not prompt Japan’s military leaders to call for an end to the war. On the contrary, the three top leaders endorsed plans to continue the war and even to abolish any vestige of civilian government—an extremely ominous development that leaves open the question of how the war might have ended absent that mechanism for intervention by the emperor.

From what I have read so far, other arguments from the 'revisionist school' tends to suggest that either the Japanese were ready to surrender already, or that it was the Soviet entry into the War that precipitated surrender. In either case, these arguments tend to suggest that using the atomic bombs at all was unnecessary, and not that the US should have first demonstrated them before use.

Thanks so much Yuuichi and Wyatt, for deepening this fascinating discussion.
I've begun my own tentative 'digging in' to the topic, and have two lingering questions in light of the arguments cited by Wyatt above for the American decision not to provide further warnings to the Japanese (and be patient about having them listened to), or demonstrate the power of the atomic bombs on uninhabited locales, before attacking the two cities.
Grayling claims (in the YouTube video cited earlier, around the 7:30 mark) that Japan had 'made overtures' about a ceasefire or truce, via Russia, months before the atomic bombs were dropped, but that the U.S. turned a deaf ear (ostensibly because of the condition about leaving the emperor in place).
Around the 8:20 mark in the same video, Grayling suggests that Truman had firmly decided "not to talk with the Japanese about a ceasefire until the bombs had been dropped" (and that Henry Stimson suggested bombing an uninhabited island, but was rebuffed).
These certainly seem like powerful indictments. Anyone know of other scholars who have argued for or against Truman's (seeming) culpability on these specific claims?

I cannot thank you enough, Wyatt, for this great and thoughtful effort to answer my very small but most painful question, like a thorn in my foot. I shall never forget it.
With my apologies to the other forum members, I shall take it up very carefully, and welcome those not interested in my hard little question to simply ignore this very long response. As I said to Josh Trichilo earlier, how we answer such hard little questions sometimes defines us very deeply, and we, or rather I, must be very careful.
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To the fatal ‘Interim Committee’ meeting then, and Mr. Newman’s very assured convictions.
During the morning, Ernest Lawrence had suggested giving the Japanese a harmless demonstration before using the bomb for military advantage. This suggestion was taken up during the noon hour. General Marshall was not present; perhaps the outcome would have been different had he been able to argue for the moral position he had presented to Stimson.
If so, then why is it “easy to see” why it was "shot down"?
And, if “perhaps the outcome would have been different”, history would have been different as well. Perhaps the demonstration would have failed, but undoubtedly America would have tried.
Without him, the demonstration idea was shot down. In hindsight it is easy to see why.
Where would such a demonstration be held? In neutral territory, as Alexander Sachs suggested, with many observers from other nations?
Why?
Much time would be required to make arrangements,
Proof?
no one knew the bomb would work,
According to the Jennings report, they were sure of the first bomb.
and a dud would be disastrous.
Thus, a ‘dud’ was not likely.
But even if it was a dud, where is the proof that this would be “disastrous”. If it works even one time, it may work again. Mr. Newman is playing with absolutes and certainties, when possibilities are all that truly matter, especially to the moral question.
There was no warrant at all for believing that General Anami Korechika and his military colleagues would give up their determination to fight to the bitter end however spectacular the demonstration.
Proof (for the absolute claim)?
And even if so, given the stakes involved, why is this a reason for not trying?
The essential logic of Mr. Newman’s analysis is sophistical. Please see also several examples below.
Since the military firmly controlled what appeared in the Japanese press, the people would not be informed no matter what demonstration was staged.
This does not matter (enough).
If the demonstration were held very high over a Japanese city, where the fireball could be seen but would do little damage, the Japanese generals would treat it as so much pyrotechnics.
He seems a very confident (and absolute) psychologist, as Mr. McCloy below.
No one present at the luncheon believed that a bloodless demonstration would impress the Japanese military.
Colonel Stimson (and Mr. Lawrence) clearly thought it worth a try.
Mr. Newman is again being sophistical. The question is not one of ‘would’ but of ‘could’. The argument was not, and need not be, that it would, but merely that it could impress the Japanese military, and the ‘burden of proof’, given the horrific consequences, is not on Colonel Stimson but on those rejecting the attempt. Mr. Newman’s entire argument rests on this mistake.
If the time and place of a demonstration over a sparsely populated area of Japan were announced, the remnants of Japan's air force could still interfere with the planes.
This has been thoroughly proven incorrect. As the Jennings report confirmed, America had complete control of the sky.
American prisoners of war could be brought to the spot.
Not to a neutral site.
Should the demonstration take place anyway, the generals could again deny that the weapon was lethal.
Here again, sophistry. The question here is one of ‘would’ not ‘could’. Would they? For certain? Proof?
And there was still the dud possibility.
Please see above.
The Alamogordo test was of a stationary device, not a bomb.
As stated, they had no doubt the first bomb at least would work. And even if not, this too is no reason not to try.
Further, a demonstration, however impressive, would preempt the shock value of the weapon,
As Americans would say, ‘So what?’.
and it would waste a bomb, very few of which would be available in 1945.
The consensus is: one every two weeks.
The consensus on 31 May was "no demonstration."
But, as the reasons supplied by Mr. Newman are for me weak, or worse, and the ‘stakes’ are so high—historic infamy on a par with Hitler (at least in the mind of Colonel Stimson, the Secretary of War)—I remain troubled by the question, Why did they not at least try?
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To Mr. Compton:
The difficulties of making a purely technical demonstration that would carry its impact effectively into Japan's controlling councils were indeed great. We had to count on every possible effort to distort even obvious facts. Experience with the determination of Japan's fighting men made it evident that the war would not be stopped unless these men themselves were convinced of its futility.
As with the sophistry of Mr. Newman, this is only a reason not to expect success, not a reason not to try. My question is why did they not try.
The point of the knife is very sharp: Did America do all it could to avoid the slaughter of 100,000 innocent women, children and old people, or did it not?
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To Dr. Szilard:
I think it is clear that you can't demonstrate a bomb over an uninhabited island. You have to demolish a city.
Proof? How can he prove this, beyond any reasonable doubt? He is a physicist, not a psychologist. Finally, only God can be sure of this. And let us not forget, as it is so easy to do: we are not talking here about a Pavlov experiment. We are talking about the horrific destruction of 100,000 innocent women, children and old people. The magnitude of the consequence means that any doubt, any doubt whatsoever, must be decisive.
(Also, Dr. Szilard seems to have been more preoccupied with his ‘Place in History’ (e.g., the cold war ‘doomsday’ threat) than with innocent Japanese lives.)
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To Mr. McCloy:
The decisions recommending the use of the bomb, made by the interim committee formed by President Truman, were reached after thorough exploration of every possible angle: Could you have a demonstration? What would be its effects? We had not at that time seen the explosion at Alamogordo, but I can just say that if I had been a Japanese observer and seen the bomb go off at Alamogordo, I would not have advised surrender. It's one thing to see something go off, causing no damage at all but creating a great ball of fire and obviously of tremendous power, but it's another thing to say: "Well, now, they set this off on a tower; maybe it weighs 50 tons. How do we know they can deliver it?" And I am sure that anyone who was a sound thinker
Probably, but certainly? The burden of proof here does not lie on those who wished to try, but on those who rejected even the attempt. And surely the proof must be very strong indeed to justify the slaughter of so many innocent people.
would have said: "No, that doesn't convince us. In the first place, would they have another?" For example, the German scientists believed that it would be impossible for us to make an atomic bomb, and that if we did we could make only one.
Then explode two.
Okinawa was over, the war was in a ‘pause’. What was the hurry?
“What if the Russians get involved? Then we won’t be the only victors to be lord over Japan. Thus, let us hurry and destroy a 100,000 innocent people.”
Is this the argument?
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To Mr. Franks:
It took twenty-four hours for Tokyo to learn of the damage to Hiroshima and the American claim that it was inflicted by an atomic bomb. The militarists immediately erected two lines of defense: first, whatever struck Hiroshima, it was not an atomic bomb; second, even if it was an atomic bomb, the difficulty of manufacturing fissionable material to power the weapon meant the U.S. could not have that many bombs, or that the bombs would not be that powerful. These conclusions were the fruit of Japan’s own efforts to build an atomic bomb. These exertions provided no useable weapon, but did instruct Japan’s leaders in the difficulty of producing fissionable material. This revelation also demonstrates the futility of any single demonstration of an atomic weapon.
Then explode two. And if “the militarists” do as you think they will do, you have done what you could. You have at least tried to save the lives of all those people, and it is (if anyone can be blamed in such a horrible situation) the militarists’ fault, not yours any longer.
Further, the news of Soviet intervention did not prompt Japan’s military leaders to call for an end to the war. On the contrary, the three top leaders endorsed plans to continue the war and even to abolish any vestige of civilian government—an extremely ominous development that leaves open the question of how the war might have ended absent that mechanism for intervention by the emperor.
A perfectly specious argument for not trying.
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My thanks again, Wyatt, for this very fine research. It is so broad and thorough, and the arguments so weak, that I feel I am finally beginning to sense an answer to my question at last, and can soon ‘get out of the way’.
If you will permit me, I would like to take up your ‘racist’ comment first, and then conclude by considering the heart of your response.
With respect to the racism question,
First, I would prefer not to label this as a ‘racism question’, if possible. ‘Racism’ is a broad, ‘loaded’ and simplistic term, used too easily and with much built-in meanings that can distract us from the special context we are dealing with. I would prefer, if you are willing, to think of this as a question of dehumanization, which you rightly noted was increasing over the course of the war. As with the Jews (and to a lesser extent the Slavs) for Hitler, the Japanese had somehow ceased to be fully human for the ‘Interim Committee’, I think. ‘Racism’ may be a species of this problem, but this problem, this process, runs much deeper than the much-talked of rhetoric of racism.
I cannot answer that conclusively. But after reading accounts of how Allied war planners optimized bomber loads over Germany to maximize the number of civilian deaths per bomb, I'm not sure that it played that large a factor. It seems like the Allies were willing to do whatever they felt it took to end the war, against any enemy or race.
Here we return to the ‘firebombing’ question, and Josh Trichilo’s argument that, ‘well, so what, another mass destruction of innocent civilians, what is so special about the atomic bomb?’.
I think there are two special things about the bomb, one technical, and one, may I say, ‘mythological’.
Technically, a single bomb, with this cataclysmic effect, was simply different than all other forms of destruction theretofore. And this is why, I think, General Marshall and Colonel Stimson, both military men, drew such a strong line before the bomb, and why the Hollywood film lied about the 'warning leaflets'. Whatever you or Josh or I may think, these great men of war, and of their time, did not think exploding the atom bomb on innocent people was just another form of “optimized bomber loads”. It was, for them, if not for you, an epochal action, in danger of bringing down historic “opprobrium” or comparison to “Hitler’s atrocities”. It was, is, and forever will be perhaps, the greatest and most concentrated symbol of man's capacity and willingness to destroy.
And, as a single bomb, with complete control of the skies, it could be demonstrated in a uniquely impressive manner, and was demonstrated, in a uniquely impressive manner, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They too were demonstrations, we must not forget. But demonstrations that destroyed 100,000 innocent people. As the historian McCormick said, in my first post, "A prearranged demonstration of the atomic bomb on a noninhabited target, as some scientists had recommended, would not do. That could demonstrate the power of the bomb, but it could not demonstrate the American will to use the awful power."
America had to demonstrate that it was willing to slaughter countless innocent people, and this was what Hiroshima was for. Not to demonstrate the bomb, but to demonstrate the willingness of America to kill, and kill again, like Hitler.
And finally, your essential response, Wyatt.
As to my own opinions, they remain generally unformed. I find the arguments against the effectiveness of a demonstration convincing.
I envy your conviction.
But who was arguing for the effectiveness of a demonstration? No one.
We are discussing the horrific destruction of 100,000 innocent women, children and old people. Assume, for a moment, if you would, that Ottawa and not Hiroshima were being destroyed in one searing blast, and with it, your children, your family and your friends. Would you still be so convinced? Or rather, more importantly, would your conviction leave you satisfied as you seem here? And it is not enough, I think, to say, ‘No, I am not satisfied. But I am nonetheless convinced of their arguments.’ Dissatisfaction can only mean making the attempt, however hopeless it may have looked, unless the attempt can be proved to be hopeless. And who has, who could ever, in the vast complex changing mix of factors at the time, prove that?
Can you, can anyone say, for certain, it could not work, one or even two demonstrations, perhaps even one city but not then two?
At what odds does your heart simply say no? If it had a 1/1,000 chance, would you try? Remember, if you do not try, I can tell you that you are 100% certain to kill 100,000 innocent women and children and old people, like your mother, your child or your grandparents.
If it had only a 1/100,000 chance, is it then okay to kill them all?
Or do you feel, as I do, that all this cool thinking is finally sick and inhuman, and all we can truly say is, if there is any doubt, we must try?
American justice is founded on the principle: better one hundred guilty men go free, than one innocent man be imprisoned. How many innocent people must die before this same principle becomes active in our mind here?
Are you beyond ‘any reasonable doubt’ that a demonstration could not work? And remember, I include the possibility of two or more demonstrations, and maybe one city, if absolutely necessary, but not two population centers, with no warning, which is what the Interim Committee decided in that fateful ‘lunch hour’.
And if it failed, if you let a hundred guilty men go free, you could take comfort in the thought that at least you tried to save that one innocent man.
By not even trying, by not even seriously considering trying, ‘over lunch’, in the comfort of the 'Interim Committee' meeting, America answered my question forever, it seems:
“No, those 100,000 innocent women, children and old people were not even worth trying to save from destruction.”
I see no escape from this conclusion.

This is the book that waits to be written of the ordinary lives of Arab children, women and old people, blown to pieces from the sky.

To add to this conversation I recommend everyone take a look at the Hiroshima Maidens and look at how US war crimes were left out of the creation of warcrimes and human rights law. I'll dig up some sources and would love to hear peoples thoughts.